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DQ案中追溯的問題及其他

2017/7/18 — 15:02

2017年7月14日,高等法院就議員宣誓覆核案頒下判詞,裁定劉小麗、羅冠聰、梁國雄及姚松炎宣誓無效,失去議員資格。當日下午,四人聯同其他非建制派議員召開記者會。

2017年7月14日,高等法院就議員宣誓覆核案頒下判詞,裁定劉小麗、羅冠聰、梁國雄及姚松炎宣誓無效,失去議員資格。當日下午,四人聯同其他非建制派議員召開記者會。

謝連忠律師在臉書上寫下:“輸硬的官司,有乜好打?因為人大釋法,已經DQ 咗6個,法庭根本無彎轉,再打落去,連底褲都輸埋,我建議「辭職抗議」,留返D錢選過。政治權利上,唔好再對香港司法制度有幻想,誤以為是公平,有「人大釋法」,根本唔會對你公平。”

陳弘毅也撰文,“釋法確有追溯力但對當事人或有不公”,及“在其他行使普通法的地區,法院為法律作詳細解釋或修正解釋時都會追溯力。不過當事人在釋法前,只可以根據當時的法律和解釋,來判斷自己行為會帶來的後果。因此事後才以新的解釋判斷他當時的行為,可能會有不公,所以現代法律一般都會有追溯力的限制,尤其是刑事案件,除非追溯力對當事人有利。”

這裡也嘗試回應羅冠聰的 “今天宣的誓 犯了明日釋的法”的問題。羅冠聰的具體行文是“試想想,宣誓後,人大可以依照你宣誓的內容,將毫無問題的政治表態以有追溯力的釋法,裁定有罪,立即取消資格而非安排重新宣誓,是赤裸裸的濫權逼害。”這一點,我無異議,今次人大釋法明顯是一政治決定。區慶祥若運用普通法慣用的客觀測試 ─ 如何向一位合理人士傳遞的訊息,可能也會得到這一結論(註1)。但明顯地,區慶祥無能力改變釋法 (註二)─This conclusion is binding on this court.  This point is therefore simply not open to Mr Lee to argue.另外,區慶祥也表明,除了依據釋法外,它還依據一些本地案例 (註三)。

廣告

能否追溯?

基本法的第八章的釋法中表明“以前作出的判決不受影響。”,而修法沒有此項。這是因為釋法在理論上是解釋清楚,因而它認為原該如是。修法則改變原有的。因而,有追溯性(局限於未判案件),在形式上沒有問題。問題出在人大本身,中共以此進行政治審查。

廣告

另外,基本法第八章與其餘部份是一併通過的。若將第八章的詮釋放回香港處理,則行政部份(特首選舉及任命)必需放回香港,在現政治局面裡明顯不行。就算將人大改為最高法院,港人也未必接受。因而,問題根源還是中共這萬惡政權。

筆者的意見是,追溯的形式本身並不荒謬,荒謬在其運作。

政府放棄應訊的問題

這似乎表示釋出善意,但筆者認為這不是和解的足夠條件。其理由如下:

區慶祥表示政府是合適的起訴機構 ─ the CE and the SJ are the proper parties to bring these proceedings (註五),並不表示政府必須應訊。

但就算政府不派出代表,這不表示法庭不能履行其責任,正如法庭面對一位很糟糕的政府律師 ─ the court has a duty to adjudicate and rule on the matters(註六)。

辭職後會否撤銷起訴?

這也是謝連忠提出的問題。若當事人已不是議員,法官如何撤銷其議員資格呢?在回答 “假設你今日辭職,DQ案一樣可以繼續。追薪一樣由10月12日至到今日。無分別”時,需要再看一看判詞。從對4人的判決中,共8項,沒有一項與罰款有關(註七)。明顯地,若辭職後照判,法官不能作同一類似的判決,因為不適用。最重要的是第11章 《宣誓及聲明條例》沒有罰則,因而追回酬金不是起訴的原因。其原因是符合憲制責任 ─ comply with the constitutional requirements provided in the BL.。

假若真的強行起訴,其衍生的問題是:市民可否訴訟黃毓民在2012年立法會宣誓玩嘢及追回其薪酬?這明顯地不可能。那麼,其《時效條例》為何?追溯期為何?

 

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附錄
註一

客觀測試

測試一

宣誓人的行為、態度及言詞如何向一位合理人士傳遞的訊息。

測試二

某客觀組成不符合宣誓內容的做法。

37.   In this respect, given the objective assessment, the court would look at the conducts, manner and words adopted by an oath taker in taking the LegCo Oath with a view to deciding what meaning those conducts, manner and words convey to a reasonable person, and whether he or she intentionally acted in such a way.  In this objective exercise, the court is not concerned with the subjective meaning of the conducts, manner and words adopted by the oath taker and the oath taker’s subjective intention or thinking in so doing is irrelevant.  Cf: Ming Shiu Chung v Ming Shiu Sum (2006) 9 HKCFAR 334 at paragraph 72, per Ribeiro PJ

註二.

20.   The Interpretation as to the true and proper meaning of BL104 is binding on all the courts in Hong Kong.  See: Director of Immigration v Chong Fong Yuen (2001) 4 HKCFAR 211 at 222G-H, per Li CJ; the CA Judgment, paragraphs 8, 29, 53 - 58; the CFI Judgment, paragraph 20.

註三

26.   Upon considering the plain words of BL104, the Interpretation, the relevant provisions in the ODO, the CA Judgment, the CA Leave Judgment, and the CFI Judgment, together with the authorities cited in those judgments, the court has identified the following legal principles which govern the taking of the LegCo Oath as prescribed by BL104.

註四

第八章: 本法的解釋和修改

第一百五十八條

本法的解釋權屬於全國人民代表大會常務委員會。

全國人民代表大會常務委員會授權香港特別行政區法院在審理案件時對本法關於香港特別行政區自治範圍內的條款自行解釋。

香港特別行政區法院在審理案件時對本法的其他條款也可解釋。但如香港特別行政區法院在審理案件時需要對本法關於中央人民政府管理的事務或中央和香港特別行政區關係的條款進行解釋,而該條款的解釋又影響到案件的判決,在對該案件作出不可上訴的終局判決前,應由香港特別行政區終審法院請全國人民代表大會常務委員會對有關條款作出解釋。如全國人民代表大會常務委員會作出解釋,香港特別行政區法院在引用該條款時,應以全國人民代表大會常務委員會的解釋為準。但在此以前作出的判決不受影響。

全國人民代表大會常務委員會在對本法進行解釋前,徵詢其所屬的香港特別行政區基本法委員會的意見。

第一百五十九條

本法的修改權屬於全國人民代表大會。

本法的修改提案權屬於全國人民代表大會常務委員會,國務院和香港特別行政區。香港特別行政區的修改議案,須經香港特別行政區的全國人民代表大會代表三分之二多數、香港特別行政區立法會全體議員三分之二多數和香港特別行政區行政長官同意後,交由香港特別行政區出席全國人民代表大會的代表團向全國人民代表大會提出。

本法的修改議案在列入全國人民代表大會的議程前,先由香港特別行政區基本法委員會研究並提出意見。

本法的任何修改,均不得同中華人民共和國對香港既定的基本方針政策相抵觸。

註五

(5)    Mr Leung’s additional submission to say that the proceedings are brought for political considerations because it is “unique” for the executive (being the CE and the SJ) to sue the legislative (viz the President and the four elected members-elect) is, with the greatest respect, without any substance. As a matter of proper legal procedures and rights, the CE and the SJ are the proper parties to bring these proceedings concerning the constitutional compliance by members-elect of the LegCo to take the LegCo Oath. See: the CA Judgment, paragraphs 48 - 50, per Cheung CJHC.

註六

(6)    Moreover, as emphasized by Poon JA in the CA Judgment at paragraph 87, elected members-elect of the LegCo must also comply with the constitutional requirements provided in the BL. When disputes arise as to whether individual LegCo members have breached the constitutional requirements mandated in the BL, the court has a duty to adjudicate and rule on the matters, and in so doing, the court does not seek to undermine the authority or function of the LegCo or diminish the mandate that the electors gave to the LegCo members concerned. Rather, the court ensures that the LegCo or the members concerned exercise their powers lawfully in accordance with the constitutional requirements to maintain the integrity of the LegCo and the confidence of the public in the institution.

註七

(2)    Under the Origination Summons in HCMP 3381/2016:

(a)    Declarations that:

(i)           The LegCo Oath purportedly taken or made by Ms Lau on 12 October 2016 is invalid.

(ii)          Ms Lau has since been disqualified from assuming and entering on the Office or has vacated the same.

(iii)         Ms Lau is not entitled to retake the LegCo Oath.

(iv)         The LegCo Oath purportedly taken or made by Ms Lau on 2 November 2016 is invalid.

(v)          The Office purportedly held by Ms Lau is now vacant.

(vi)     Ms Lau acted as a member of LegCo and/or claimed to be entitled to act as a member of LegCo while disqualified from acting in such office.

(vii)  Ms Lau is not entitled to act as a member of the LegCo or claim to act as a member of the LegCo.

(b)    An injunction to restrain Ms Lau from acting as a member of the LegCo and claiming to act as a member of the LegCo.

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